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WHAT DO WE DO NOW?: EXAMINING CIVILIAN 
MASCULINITY/IES IN CONTEMPORARY LIBERAL CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS 
KATHARINE M MILLAR*
Katharine Millar is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics. Her research examines 
gendered cultural narratives underlying the modern collective use of force. Email: K.M.Millar@lse.ac.uk. Address: London 
School of Economics, Department of International Relations, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE. This piece, accepted 
September 2018, appears in the Review of International Studies. 
Abstract 
In contemporary Western, liberal democratic societies, the soldier is frequently regarded as “the 
best of us”, taking on the unlimited liability for the protection and betterment of the whole. In 
the context of volunteer militaries and distant conflicts, the construction of men (and the 
universalized masculine citizen) as “always-already” soldiers (or potential soldiers) poses a 
substantial obstacle to the identification or performance of “good” civilian masculinity – 
particularly during wartime. The theorization and articulation of a positive, substantive civilian 
masculinity, or masculinities, rather than one defined simply by an absence of military service and 
implication in the collective use of violence, is a central challenge of contemporary politics. As a 
means of illuminating the complex dynamics of this challenge, this article examines contemporary 
charitable practices of civilian support for the military, and corresponding constructions of 
masculinity, in the UK during the “war on terror”. In doing so, the article demonstrates the ways 
in which gendered “civilian anxiety”, through its connection to citizenship, comes to condition the 
political possibilities and subjectivities of all those who seek belonging in the liberal political 
community. The article concludes by arguing for the essentiality of a research programme 
oriented around “civilianness”, and civilian masculinity/ies.  
Keywords: civilian; masculinity; civil-military relations; liberalism; citizenship; United Kingdom; 
military; charity; anxiety 
Introduction 
Civilians – as civilians – do not play a prominent role in international relations theorising or 
analysis. Indeed, civilians appear more often in IR as dead bodies – civilian casualties – than as 
socially-embedded, politically relevant subjects.2 There are exceptions to this generalisation: 
analyses of the laws of war and human rights reference civilians as objects of regulation;3 the 
military sociological literature valorises civilians as agents of restraint in the democratic control 
                                               
* Earlier versions of this article were presented at the International Studies Association Annual conference (2017); 
European International Studies Association Annual conference (2017), and the International Relations colloquium at Leiden 
University. I would like to thank the RIS reviewers for their discerning comments. Thanks are also due to Yuna Han, Aiko 
Holvikivi, Meg Millar, Sharri Plonski, Mike Sampson, and particularly Chris Rossdale for their insightful engagements with 
various iterations of this article. 
2 See PRIO, ‘Armed Conflict Data Set’, available at {https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/}, accessed 15 February 
2017. 
3 See Jennifer M. Welsh, Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (Oxford University Press, 2004) 
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of armed force;4 and liberal democratic peace theory at least partially envisages civilians (though 
more as citizens) as a potential brake on arbitrary wars.5 Feminist and gender analyses have 
highlighted the ways in which the categories of “civilian” and “soldier”, and the purportedly binary 
distinction between them, reproduce, and are reproduced, by gendered hierarchies of 
masculinity/femininity, protector/protected, and agency/passivity.6 Associated studies examine 
the empirical effect and political consequences of this powerful gendered discursive formation 
for the laws of war7 and the differential experiences of civilians in personal and professional 
contact with the military institution.8 While crucially important, much of this work has centred on 
examining the ways in which the gendered Beautiful Soul/Just Warrior binary serves9 to shore up 
the heroic masculinity of the figurative soldier and the corresponding legitimacy of the 
(nation)state. As a result, this scholarship tends to reify the enduring empirical association of 
soldier and masculinity and femininity and civilian.  
As such, this inattention to politically-relevant civilians may be at least partially attributed to the 
power of the common Western construction of men (and the masculine/ised citizen) as “always-
already” soldiers (or potential soldiers).10 The ideal-typical “soldier” is frequently figuratively – 
though far from universally, empirically – linked to the valorised characteristics of Western 
masculinity, such as autonomy, bravery, self-sacrifice, rationality, and strength.11 As observed by 
Basham, though there are important differences across national and cultural contexts, military 
service and sacrifice are closely connected to understandings of masculinity and normative 
citizenship.12  The notion of heroic, masculine military service, however, exists in tension with the 
contemporary state of a good deal of Western - particularly liberal democratic - civil-military 
relations.  
Of the 88 states qualified as “free” in the 2018 Freedom House report13 (an imperfect 
approximation of liberal democracy, to be sure),14 66 lack conscription.15 The end of the Cold War 
saw a sharp drop in conscription, particularly within Europe, to the extent that national service 
remains in only ten European states.16 We see a trend where, in an era of professional militaries 
and geographically-distant conflicts, the vast majority of liberal democratic citizens only indirectly 
                                               
4 See Peter D. Feaver, ‘The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control’, Armed 
Forces & Society, 23.2 (1996), pp. 149-178. 
5 See John M. Owen, ‘How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace’, International Security, 19.2 (1994), pp.  87-125. 
6 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Women and War (University of Chicago Press, 1987); Cynthia Enloe, Maneuvers: The International 
Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives (University of California Press, 2000). 
7 See Charli Carpenter, 'Innocent Women and Children': Gender, Norms and the Protection of Civilians (Routledge, 2016); 
Helen Kinsella, The Image before the Weapon: A Critical History of the Distinction between Combatant and Civilian. (Cornell 
University Press, 2011). 
8 Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (University of California Press, 
2014). 
9 Elshtain, 1987. 
10 Deborah, Cowen, Military Workfare: The Soldier and Social Citizenship in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2008), p. 17. 
11 Frank Barrett, ‘The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity: The Case of the US Navy’, Gender, Work & 
Organization, 3:3 (1996), pp. 129-42. 
12 Victoria Basham, War, Identity and the Liberal State (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 40. 
13 Freedom House, ‘Table of Countries 2018’, available at {https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-
country-scores} accessed 5 June 2018. 
14 Joe Foweraker and Roman Krznaric, 2000. ‘Measuring Liberal Democratic Performance: An Empirical and Conceptual 
Critique’, Political Studies, 48:4 (2000), pp.759-787. 
15 CIA World Factbook, ‘Military Service Age and Obligation’, available at {https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/fields/2024.html} accessed 5 June 2018. 
16  Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Greece, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Panu Poutvaara and 
Andreas Wagener, ‘Ending Military Conscription’, CESifo DICE Report 2011, available at {https://www.cesifo-
group.de/DocDL/dicereport211-rr1.pdf} accessed 5 June 2011. 
 3 
interact with the military.17 By sheer numbers, the “civilian” experience of wartime is far more 
common than that of “soldier”. The situation is, of course, not limited to liberal democratic and/or 
Western societies; in wars with conscription there have generally been more people outside the 
armed forces than in.18 But as this model of limited, distant, professionalised, and predominantly 
Western war proliferates, the possibilities of and for ‘civilianness’ as a meaningful political 
subjectivity within liberal democracies seems radically under-examined.   
So, should we care? Or rather, how does this matter? The focus on soldiers is, in many ways, 
entirely logical, considering the normative and political stakes of organised violence. It is also, 
however, a reflection of the overarching, gendered tendency in international relations to regard 
the activities and subjectivities conventionally associated with men and/or masculinity as the 
legitimate (and “obvious”) objects of academic IR inquiry, while relegating purportedly 
“domestic”, feminised activities and persons to the margins.19 This article, in contrast, argues that 
civilians, as socially-embedded and politically relevant subjects, are key to understanding both 
longstanding assumptions of IR theory and, more importantly, contemporary liberal civil-military 
relations. It interrogates, informed by Kinsella, the ways in which the “reliance [on] negative 
definition” of civilian as simply not-a-soldier “prohibits consideration of the significance of the 
concept of civilian itself”.20 
To open this discussion, I examine an illustrative case study – the gendered dynamics of charitable 
support for the military in the UK – to think through two key lacunae: a) the under-theorisation 
of “civilian” in its own right; and b) a corresponding inattention to the empirical possibility/ies and 
performance(s) of explicitly civilian masculinity/ies. Though attentive to the contingent and fluid 
nature of both gendered/ing norms and the liberal civil-military divide, I foreground the under-
examined notion of “civilian masculinity/ies” as a means of teasing out the complexities of 
enduring Western liberal constructions of violent political agency, and the challenges of 
identifying and theorising an alternative. In doing so, I draw upon liberal political thought and 
popular culture to generate a heuristic, conceptual account of military service, citizenship, and 
gender that exposes broader challenges in untangling normative masculinity and collective 
violence.  
The logic of inquiry is similar to that of studies examining female combatants and their gendered 
performances within the armed forces. Due to the patriarchal disconnect between feminine/ised 
bodies and the conduct of violence, analyses of female soldiers are understood to reveal broader 
dynamics of gender (and sexuality, race, class, etc.), power, and violence within the institution 
that might otherwise be invisible.21 Here, I flip this critical impulse to leverage the seemingly 
parallel structural and ideological tension22 between masculinity and civilianness to consider the 
political relationship between civilians and war as a similarly exigent normalised silence. This 
analytical emphasis on masculine/ised civilian subjects creates space to examine potential 
                                               
17 Many of the analytical insights may indeed travel beyond the West – but as the questions and account offered here rely 
on Western-generated understandings of gender, and the gendered nature of liberal politics, the argument should be 
bounded appropriately. 
18 See Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
19 Enloe, 2014. 
20 Kinsella, 2011, p. 6. 
21 Annika Kronsell, ‘Gendered Practices in Institutions of Hegemonic Masculinity: Reflections from Feminist Standpoint 
Theory’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 7:2 (2005), pp.280-298. 
22 This refers to broadly circulating cultural understandings of violence and gendered citizenship – akin to the idealised, 
figurative citizen-soldier - and is not necessarily reflected empirically in a given individual’s lived experience or self-
understanding. 
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counter-performances of patriarchal, frequently militaristic, masculine/soldier feminine/civilian 
binaries while simultaneously attending to the ways in which these constructions continue to 
powerfully inform and constrain the possibilities of, and for, meaningful civilianness.  
“Civilian masculinity”, then, refers to the performance of masculinity/ies that are substantively 
civilian, rather than structurally assigned as such by existing notions about the civil-military divide. 
It is less a question of the many, many masculinities in a given place and time that are not 
articulated in military terms23 than one of the possibilities and ambiguities of masculinities that 
engage with civilianness per se as socially intelligible and politically legitimate. The masculinities 
performed by football supporters,24 for instance, are structurally civilian in so far as (typically) 
those involved are not members of the armed forces or the immediate surrounding community. 
For the purposes of this study, however, they would not be considered substantively civilian 
masculinities, as they are not (again, typically) made politically and socially meaningful vis-a-vis 
collective violence and/or normative public personhood.  
The open question as to the possibility of this form of masculinity/ies, conceptually and 
empirically detached from violence and domination, is a central concern of contemporary politics. 
In addition to the transformation in civil-military relations described above, the plausibility of 
positive and substantive masculinity/ies underlies discussions of toxic masculinity,25 rape 
culture,26 and the “appropriate” gender performance and temperament of world leaders.27 In a 
more “immediately” IR context, similar concerns regarding “good” public masculinity may be 
observed in the rise of international “gender experts”, and the proliferation of international 
organisation-sponsored gender “training” and “mainstreaming”.28 The article thus speaks to 
contemporary scholarship within critical masculinity studies examining “new”, “positive” political 
masculinities that strive to move away from violence.29 Attending to the political possibilities of 
civilian masculinities animates these debates within, and highlights their essentiality to, 
international relations. 
The aim of the article, then, is not to provide a straightforward and too-simple “diagnosis”, 
reconstruction, or universally-applicable reading of civilian masculinity/ies. Instead, the case is 
used to open and explore a series of theoretical and political questions about the analytical, 
ideological, and normative relationship(s) between masculinity, violence, and political agency 
within contemporary, predominantly Western, liberal democratic societies.30 I begin with an 
analysis of the ambiguous political possibilities of (and for) civilian masculinity through an 
empirical case study of charitable civilian support for the UK military during the “global war on 
terror” (2001-2010). I then use this case to construct a conceptual, heuristic account of the 
intellectual and popular context within which contemporary liberal civilian masculinity/ies 
                                               
23  Michael S. Kimmel and Jeff Hearn, Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities (London: Sage, 2005); Robert William 
Connell and Raewyn Connell, Masculinities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). 
24 Anthony King, ‘The Lads: Masculinity and the New Consumption of Football’, Sociology, 31:2 (1997), pp. 329-346. 
25 Kathleen E. Miller, ‘Sport-related identities and the “toxic jock”’, Journal of Sport Behaviour, 32.1 (2009), p. 69. 
26 Emilie Buchwald, Pamela R. Fletcher, and Martha Roth, eds. Transforming a Rape Culture. Minneapolis, MN: Milkweed 
Editions, 2005. 
27 Jacqueline Rose, ‘Donald Trump’s Victory is a Disaster for Modern Masculinity’, The Guardian, 15 November 2016, 
available at  {https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/15/trump-disaster-modern-masculinity-sexual-
nostalgian-oppressive-men-women} accessed 15 February 2017. 
28 Jacqui True, ‘Mainstreaming Gender in Global Public Policy’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 5.3 (2003), pp. 368-
396. 
29 Henri Myrttinen, ‘Stabilizing or Challenging Patriarchy?: Sketches of Selected “New” Political Masculinities’, Men and 
Masculinities, (2018), DOI: 10.1177/1097184X18769137. 
30 Anne Sisson-Runyan and V. Spike Peterson, Global Gender Issues in the New Miillennium (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 
2013), pp. 47 and 161. 
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operate. First, I outline the gendered nature of normative citizenship, as productive of, and 
produced within, the liberal distinction between public and private. I then demonstrate that this 
normative (masculinised) citizenship is premised not only upon the conduct of politics in the 
public sphere, but an underlying, foundational expectation of military service: the liberal military 
contract. Together, these two analytical moves illuminate the broad ideological and empirical 
conditions of possibility for – and potential elision of – civilian masculinity/ies within the liberal 
political imaginary. Subsequently, I develop the concept of “gendered civilian anxiety” to capture 
the disconnect between gendered myths of heroism, military service, and citizenship and the 
contemporary reliance on a volunteer military. The article concludes by arguing for the 
essentiality of a research programme oriented around “civilianness”, and civilian masculinity/ies. 
Seeing civilian masculinity/ies 
Methodologically, examining potential performances of civilian masculinity/ies poses an 
interesting challenge. Civilianness, particularly in societies without conscription, is in one sense, 
everything/where, as it pertains to nearly everyone. At the same time, civilianness is also nothing, 
in so far as it has little content/meaning absent a negative contrast with soldiering. Civilianness 
does not fade into the background of politics and war; it is the background. Similarly, as with 
soldiering (or gender or any other social category), civilianness is presumably not a static identity 
or status, but rather a subjectivity produced iteratively in context (albeit one that is challenging 
to empirically observe due to its sheer banality). Contemporary critical military and militarism 
scholarship have established the contingency and blurring of the civil-military divide, particularly 
within liberalism,31 understanding the two as intertwined and coproductive.32 “Civilianness”, and 
civilian masculinities, as a result, cannot be assigned or assumed a priori. Consequently, though 
there are surely a proliferation of potential civilian masculinities both globally and within a given 
society, “seeing” them requires looking for contexts in which these subjectivities have the 
potential to become politically activated and made relevant to the conduct of collective violence.  
As a practical first cut on a potentially enormous research programme, this article examines 
charitable practices of support for the UK armed forces to raise questions and identify points of 
tension surrounding the political intelligibility of civilian masculinity/ies. Several factors 
recommend UK charitable support for the military as an initial point of departure. In Anglo-
American societies, the soldier “warrior” is often posited as the apogee of citizenship and 
figurative embodiment of heroic masculinity.33  Though this is not a universal model of soldiering 
citizenship, the material and cultural power of Anglosphere militaries both globally and within 
recent coalition warfare, as observed by Enloe,34 have led to a transnational diffusion of this 
“warrior” model across contexts, including Norway and India.35 In smaller, less conventionally 
bellicose states, such as Denmark and Sweden, citizenship and military participation, though with 
more emphasis on service than war-fighting, have also come to be articulated in terms of 
                                               
31 Bryan Mabee, ‘From ‘Liberal War’ to ‘Liberal Militarism’: United States Security Policy as the Promotion of Military 
Modernity’, Critical Military Studies, 2:3 (2016), pp. 242-261. 
32 Alison Howell, ‘Forget “Militarization”: Race, Disability and the “Martial Politics” of the Police and of the 
University’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20:2 (2018), pp. 117-136. 
33 Nine Rones and Kari Fasting, ‘Theorizing Military Masculinities and National Identities: The Norwegian Experience’ in The 
Palgrave International Handbook of Gender and the Military, Duncanson, C. and R. Woodward, eds. (London: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2017), p. 146. 
34 Enloe, 2000; Clare Duncanson, Forces for Good? Military Masculinities in Iraq and Afghanistan (Hampshire: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2013). 
35 Rones and Fasting, 2017; Swati Parashar, ‘Discursive (In)securities and Postcolonial Anxiety: Enabling Excessive 
Militarism in India’, Security Dialogue, 49:1-2, (2018), pp. 123-35. 
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gendered (masculine) heroism.36 Even Germany, long regarded as an anti-militarist exception to 
the valorisation of soldiers, has begun, post-conscription, to reference militarised notions of 
masculinity in its recruitment campaigns; recruits are framed as strong, tough, “reluctant” 
warriors.37 The examination of the UK thus hinges the exploration of civilian masculinity/ies 
around a particularly influential understanding of the masculinity-citizen-soldier nexus within 
liberal democracies. In doing so, it sidesteps the US-centrism (and exceptionalism) of a good deal 
of contemporary scholarship on Western civil-military relations.  
Similarly, charitable support for the armed forces, as one of the most conventionally-recognisable 
“civilian” practices in wartime, offers a logical site for assessing the political activation and 
production of civilianness as a positive, substantive subjectivity.  As the supportive discourses and 
activities associated with charitable care align, superficially, with notions of feminised maternal 
ethics and stereotypical women’s “homefront” activities,38 and thus the conventional gendered 
structure of civil-military relations, they constitute a hard test for civilian masculinity/ies. As a 
result, examining the gendered/ing construction of charitable activities supporting the military 
enables me to empirically differentiate between masculine/feminine constructions. This avoids 
reifying conventional understandings of the gendering of the civil-military binary, as well as the 
binary itself, while remaining alive to its power and social force. This “hard test”, combined with 
the prominence of the heroic Anglosphere citizen-soldier, makes the UK a strong starting point 
for thinking through the possibilities, stakes, and meaning of civilianness and masculinity in 
contemporary liberal democracies. 
Concretely, the interpretive interrogation of the case is based on a discourse analysis of publicly-
produced texts by five anti-war and five pro-military NGO public textual productions from 2001-
2010.39 These texts were sourced from physical archives, individual activists, depository libraries, 
and the organisations themselves, as well as the Wayback Machine, an online website archive. 
Specific texts were selected for analysis on the basis of references, directly or indirectly, to the 
normative relationship between the armed forces and society, initially by keyword search (e.g. 
“support the troops”, “help for heroes”, etc.) and then by theme. The organizations were selected 
typologically to balance the inclusion of the most prominent organizations (and thus dominant 
representations) with capturing variation in the overall discourse (and thus a spectrum of 
perspectives). The inclusion of anti-war NGOs, such as the Stop the War Coalition, alongside more 
conventional military charities, such as the Royal British Legion, captures potential dissent, 
contestation, and variation in the gendered dynamics of charitable support for the armed forces.  
These texts are contextualised in broader social discourse via an analysis of the public statements 
of UK state officials (civilian and military) and the mainstream print media from the same time 
period. These texts, which include news articles, speeches, press releases, official statements, and 
legislative records, were, again, identified on the basis of keyword search for “support the troops” 
                                               
36 See Mads Daugbjerg and Birgitte Refslund Sørensen, ‘Becoming a Warring Nation: The Danish “Military Moment” and its 
Repercussions’, Critical Military Studies, 3:1 (2017), pp. 1-6; Annika Kronsell and Erika Svedberg, ‘The Swedish Military 
Manpower Policies and their Gender Implications’, The Changing Face of European Conscription (2006), pp.137-161. 
37 David Shim and Frank Stengel, ‘Die Rekruten: Exploring military recruitment of the German Armed Forces on YouTube’, 
Working Paper presented at the 59th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 4-7 April 2018, San 
Francisco, CA; David Shim and Frank Stengel, ‘Social media, Gender and the Mediatization Of War: Exploring the German 
Armed Forces’ Visual Representation of the Afghanistan Operation on Facebook.’, Global Discourse, 7:2-3 (2017), pp.330-
347. 
38 Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace, (Beacon Press, 1995). 
39 Anti-war organisations: Veterans for Peace UK, Stop the War Coalition, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, WILPF UK, 
Peace and Social Witness UK. Military charities: BLESMA, Help for Heroes, Royal British Legion, The Soldier’s Charity 
(formerly the Army Benevolent Fund), uk4uThanks! 
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or equivalent phrasing in the context of charitable support for the military. The entire corpus was 
organised with the use of the software programme NVivo and interpreted with references to 
themes including: a) the military-society relationship; b) citizenship and/or the state; and c) the 
gendering of civil and military subjectivities. The quotations presented here, drawn from a corpus 
of 238 paragraph units, and approximately 550 pages of text, should be understood as particularly 
illuminating and/or explicit illustrations of common, if frequently implicit, representations of the 
gendered military-society relationship that, in turn, form the context for the articulation of civilian 
masculinity/ies. 
Interrogatory case study: The gendered dynamics of charitable support for the UK Armed Forces 
During military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the contested legitimacy of the wars, 
calls to “help our heroes” proliferated in the United Kingdom.40 The number of charities 
established to support the military in the UK tripled every year between 2005-2011.41 This 
increase in military-related NGOs, charitable giving, and community service was accompanied by 
a general social practice of displaying or wearing, military-related apparel and symbols, such as 
bumper stickers, pins, or bracelets. “Support for the troops” has come to form a routinized 
component of British discussions of Iraq and Afghanistan, with popular pro-military practices, 
such as an annual Armed Forces Day, military volunteer awards, and recognition at sporting 
events along the US model now apparent.42 “The troops”43 comprise a key locus for the 
interpretation of war, gender, and the normative relationship between society and the military in 
the contemporary UK.44  
Charitable support and moral constructions of civil-military relations 
The most immediately striking characteristic of charitable military discourses is a sense that it is 
“good”, or “appropriate” to support the troops. A 2010 fundraising appeal statement by The UK 
Soldiers’ Charity is a good example of these constructions: 
“…We support soldiers, former soldiers and their families whatever their age, whatever their rank, whenever 
they need it. We currently support over 6,000 individuals. Last year they ranged in age from 5 months to 107 
years old. Here are just a few of their stories…It is thanks to your generosity that you make our work 
possible”.45 
                                               
40 Basham, 2013, pp. 23-7; Paul Dixon, The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to 
Iraq and Afghanistan, (Abingdon: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), p. 91. 
41 Telegraph, ‘Sir Richard Dannatt Calls for Military Charities to Work’ (15 January 2011) available at 
{http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8261482/Sir-Richard-Dannatt-callsfor-military-charities-to-work-
together.html}, accessed 15 June 2015. 
42 Dixon, 2012, pp. 131-2; John Kelly, ‘Popular Culture, Sport and the ‘Hero’-ification of British Militarism’, Sociology, 47:4 
(2012), p. 728; Katharine Millar, ‘‘They Need Our Help’: Non-governmental Organizations and the Subjectifying Dynamics of 
the Military as Social Cause’, Media, War & Conflict. 9:1 (2016), p. 10 
43 Joanna Tidy, ‘Forces Sauces and Eggs for Soldiers: Food, Nostalgia and the Rehabilitation of the British Military’, Critical 
Military Studies, 1:3 (2015), pp. 220-32; Basham, 2013. 
44 Similar practices occur elsewhere, with public commemorations of military sacrifice visible in India and the formation of 
civil society organisations expressing solidarity with military personnel and their families (often with the yellow ribbon 
associated with the US armed forces) in Germany.44 Though less pervasive than those of the UK (and the US, Canada, and 
Australia), they are suggestive of a common experience of liberal societies with professional armed forces.  Parashar, 2018, 
p. 129; Initiative Solidaritat, ‘Home page’, (2018), available at {https://solidaritaet-mit-soldaten.de}, accessed 7 June 2018. 
45 Army Benevolent Fund, ‘Our Stories’, (approx. 2010), available at: {http://www.soldierscharity.org/need-our-help/our-
stories}, accessed 16 May 2014. 
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Though the charity elsewhere makes frequent reference to the military service of the troops, in 
this passage the primary identity of those being supported is private persons in need of welfare 
services. This positioning is brought home by the visuals of the webpage, which links 
individualised stories of hardship with photos of the recipients. Men in uniform – active service 
members – are presented alongside women, the elderly, and disabled veterans in civilian clothes 
as equivalent beneficiaries of the charity. While their “militaryness” is the factor qualifying the 
troops for support, it is constructed as private social relation, rather than a public obligation or 
practice of warfare. This paternalistic support works in an affective register, using compassion to 
“draw attention to the social, political and economic needs of military families”46 – and with them, 
military personnel. By virtue of its flat, taken-for-granted presentation, supporting the troops is 
naturalized as a pro-social, laudable act.47 
This sense of private, apolitical morality is compounded by the articulation of support in an 
affective, charitable idiom. A long-time volunteer for the British Legion, for instance, describes 
her “commitment to the cause” as driven by the recognition that “There will always be ex-
servicemen and women who need our help…[W]e can encourage the younger generations to 
continue to support the ex-service community and carry on the good work of so many who went 
before them”.48 The troops are the subject of “good work”. The charity BLESMA illustrates this 
framing, as, in describing to potential donors “how you can help”, it notes that while the state 
makes general policy, the organization “concerns itself with individual cases”. It asks: “Will you 
make them your concern too?”.49 This is a moral indictment of the failure to provide support, both 
by the state and by an implicit audience of private individuals. It (re)produces “the troops” as akin 
to any other “needy” group, rather than agents of the state/nation. 
These brief examples indicate the discourse “produces the military as a notionally apolitical social 
‘cause’”.50 As causes, though imbued with moral force, have an apparently spontaneous quality,51 
they have a tendency, as observed by Sylvester in relation to development workers, to construct 
a normative dynamic wherein the benefactors are in, but not of, the communities they help. 
Donors may be “compassionate and show an admirable sense of urgency – as they hold 
themselves aloof”.52 This articulation of support constitutes it, at least superficially, as “a well-
intentioned, altruistic and unconditional interaction, wherein one individual or group acts to 
benefit another without expecting anything in return”.53 In so doing, they constitute a highly 
asymmetric power relationship between the two parties.  
These aspects of moral support – the sense of a detached, charitable duty to “help”, lack of sense 
of shared fortune, and affective, interpersonal connection – produce a moral structure of 
obligation that is not socially recognized as political. In failing to set out a rationale for support, 
                                               
46 Lisa Silvestri, ‘Surprise Homecomings and Vicarious Sacrifices’, Media, War, & Conflict, 6:2 (2013), p. 112. 
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or to construct a sense of shared community, moral support superficially (though often explicitly) 
relieves supporting the troops of any “public” character, instead relying on the idiom of affective 
care. This refusal of a political connection between the troops and supporters discursively 
removes what might, within conventional liberalism, be considered public activities and 
relationships into an ostensibly “private” realm.54 The implications of this apoliticisation of 
military care for the articulation of substantive, civilian subjectivities, however, are unclear. 
Examining the gendering of charitable support for the armed forces – and, in particular, the 
possibilities of and for civilian masculinity/ies – offers an illuminating lever on these dynamics. 
Gendered/ing supportive care 
Charitable support the troops discourses are typified by the refrain that the troops require “care” 
when they “get home”. These constructions, in conjunction with the publication of individual 
veterans’ struggles as a means of generating supportive compassion and charitable awareness, 
implicitly extrapolates from beleaguered veterans to the “troops” as a whole.55 This logic is 
extended to military personnel in the battlespace. The Stop the War Coalition, for instance, 
explicitly positions itself as a defender of the troops, arguing, “We want to save lives by bringing 
them home”.56 Moral support is a matter of the troops’ life and death. Similarly, calls to “protect” 
the troops – from the elements, from the war, from unspecified harm – are ubiquitous. Hansard 
(UK parliamentary) debates on Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, frequently involved calls to 
protect the troops through the provision of appropriate equipment and supplies, most infamously 
with respect to the implications of a 2009 helicopter shortage for force protection and the 
evacuation of the wounded.57  
Within this altruistic discourse, the figure of the masculine, agential combat soldier that we might 
expect in discussions of civil-military relations seems to recede, as the troops are constructed as 
imperilled victims of conflict.58 They are produced as what Berlant refers to as “citizen-victims – 
pathological, poignant, heroic, and grotesque”,59 marrying suffering with worthiness. The 
consequences of this figuration for the gendering of the civil-military relationship, and thus the 
possibilities for civilian masculinity/ies, could be understood in (at least) two ways: as reflecting 
an empowered feminized civilian sphere caring for a dependent, masculine troops, or as a 
structural feminization of the troops vis-à-vis agential, masculinised civilian patrons. There is a 
case to be made for both readings – and the references to “care” and “love” are suggestive of a 
potential maternal dynamic. It would be an essentialist error, however, to “conflat[e]… 
feminization with the absence of war”,60 or, conversely, the provision of care. Understanding the 
gendering dynamics of civil-military relations in the context of moral support requires examining 
the multi-faceted substantive (e.g. characteristic-based, such as loving) and relational (e.g. social 
positioning) gendering of societal supporters vis-a-vis the troops. 
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55 Katharine Millar, ‘The Plural of Soldier is Not Troops: The Distinctive Politics of Groups in Legitimating Violence’, working 
paper. 
56 Stop the War Coalition, ‘Anti-war Protesters Mark Tragic Milestone for Victims of Conflict’, (28 August 2009),  
available at: {http://web.archive.org/web/20090914084240/http://stopwar.org.uk/content/view/1459/27/}, accessed 10 
March 2014. 
57 BBC, ‘Helicopter Shortage a ‘Scandal’’, (19 July 2009), available at {http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8157978.stm}, 
accessed 13 August 2015. 
58 Millar 2016, pp. 16-17. 
59 Lauren Berlant, The Wueen of America goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1997), p.  1. 
60 Kimberly Hutchings, ‘Making Sense of Masculinity and War’, Men and Masculinities, 10:4 (2008), p. 395. 
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The above construction of civilian supporters as “protecting” the troops and “saving their lives” is 
crucial to arbitrating this gender dynamic. Protection positions supporters in a relationship of 
hierarchical superiority over the dependent troops – a situation more akin to the operation of the 
patriarchal welfare state, or masculine head of household, than a maternal logic of care. This is 
evident, for instance, in the 2010 statement of a Conservative MP that: 
“…The help that charitable and voluntary organisations and-dare I say it?-the big society have given to people 
returning from warfare goes back a long way. It is not for the state to do everything, and the state is not 
necessarily best placed to do that. We all have social responsibilities, and service charities are an excellent 
example of the big society in action.”61 
This statement, referencing a 2010 Conservative plan to encourage the provision of social services 
and supports by non-state entities,62 explicitly highlights the paternalistic dynamic between the 
“big society” of private supporters and the dependent servicemembers returning from war. 
Charitable support is constructed as a community good. It is morally superior, here, to care 
provided by the state, as it exemplifies a logic of individualistic and agential voluntary 
contribution. Crucially, the monetary transfers which typically accompany such charitable support 
have been observed by critical gender and organisational scholars to be “key for accomplishing 
masculinity”.63 This exemplar of charitable discourse subtly attributes characteristics associated 
with stereotypical hegemonic Western masculinity, such as rationality, independence, and civic-
mindedness,64 to supporters, rather than “the troops”.  
The clearest demonstration of these constructions is the discourse(s) surrounding the 
increasingly-common recognition of supporters, either in the press or through formal awards, for 
their service to military personnel. Though the campaign has subsequently been criticised for 
producing mixed results,65 the portrayal of actor Joanna Lumley during her involvement in the 
2009 campaign for UK settlement rights for Nepali Gurkha veterans provides a striking illustration 
of these masculinist constructions. In a 2009 Telegraph opinion piece, Lumley was characterised 
as having “fought a brilliant campaign” that involved the “conquest” of Westminster through a 
canny and honourable application of “the patriotic instincts and good manners of middle 
England”.66 The explicit framing of her actions in military terms flips the conventional relationship 
between a masculine military and feminised society while attaching conventional attributes of 
hegemonic masculinity – public action on behalf of others, rationality, integrity, and speaking 
truth to power – to Lumley, the civilian supporter.67 Similarly, support for the military – 
particularly disabled veterans participating in the Invictus Games – is framed as a crucial part of 
the personal maturation and redemption narrative of Prince Harry, a member of the UK royal 
family. The CEO of the Invictus Games has commented upon Prince Harry’s “real sense of 
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humility”, observing that “his is not somebody who is doing this because he needs attention”.68 
At the same time, public discourse also frequently references his active involvement in the cause, 
noting that “He weighs in. He's got good questions and he's very thoughtful”, and “detail-
oriented” in his efforts to support military families.69 Paternalistic, benevolent support, rationally 
measured and conducted without personal stake, is constituted as a central component of 
normative, implicitly masculine public virtue. 
Support for the troops – particularly that cast in the masculine idiom of contribution to the 
community – is central to social recognition as not only a good citizen, but also as a good person. 
The Sun tabloid, in conjunction with the UK Ministry of Defence, hosts the “Military Awards”, or 
“Millies”, which honour not only service people but also single out individuals and organisations 
for their exceptional “Support to the Forces”.70 In 2008, the civilian founders of Help for Heroes 
were awarded a Millie to recognize their “invaluable help to the Armed Forces”.71 In 2009, the 
Millie for best support was awarded to the town of (now Royal) Wootton Bassett, which held 
spontaneous commemorations and ceremonies as the repatriated bodies of deceased 
servicemembers were transported through the town centre.72 Prince William, in presenting the 
award, highlighted the town’s sense of honour and stoicism, noting: “One of the most remarkable 
things is that the people are so modest, they refuse to accept any praise”.73 Perhaps most 
significantly, the awards themselves have become a high profile formal event, frequently 
attended by prominent citizens and celebrities. These attendees are photographed distributing 
awards and in the company of armed forces personnel, further reinforcing both the laudability of 
charitable support and the hierarchical imbalance of status (and capital) between the supporters 
and the troops.74 This is in line with Boon’s observation that philanthropy is frequently 
constructed as commensurate with socially-valorised masculinity, “as controlled sacrifice for 
human well-being, render[s] the man who donates to the public good a heroic figure”.75 
This connection of support with good public personhood and the generation of social capital is 
also evident in efforts of both military-related charities to generate corporate sponsorship. Help 
for Heroes, for instance, frames its sponsorship opportunities as offering “a message resonating 
with consumers”76, driving sales, “building brand engagement”, promoting PR opportunities, staff 
team-building, “and, of course, rais[ing] funds that will help [H4H] rebuild lives”.77 Such charitable 
opportunities to “demonstrate company values, and your commitment to your customers, 
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employees, and local community”78 also underscore outreach efforts of the UK state under the 
Armed Forces Covenant. Businesses are also asked to sign the covenant and “promot[e] the fact 
that [they] are an armed forces-friendly organisation…by publicising our Armed Forces Covenant 
on your website and displaying the Armed Forces Covenant logo”.79 Reinforcing this message, the 
Ministry of Defence has also, as of 2014, begun issuing Defence Employer Recognition Scheme 
awards (at Bronze, Silver, and Gold levels) to recognise private sector businesses that support 
military personnel.80  
As a means of demonstrating civic engagement, community mindedness, and moral principles, 
support for the troops is constituted in the idiom of protective (and, here, conservative capitalist, 
interestingly) masculinity, in keeping with the public performance of benevolent philanthropy. In 
this way, the (re)masculinisation of the “private” sphere and supporters operates analogously to 
a dynamic observed to characterise the fundraising interactions of Israeli and American Jews. In 
these interactions, philanthropic activities “allowed American Jews not so much to replace their 
model of masculinity with a (slacker) version of the Israeli model” against which they would fall 
short, as they did not engage in military fighting themselves, but rather “hold onto theirs while 
associating themselves more closely” with the nationalistic and militarised masculinity of their 
Israeli counterparts.81 In both instances, paternalistic support reflects a need to address, albeit 
through a denial of its legitimacy, the figure of the combat soldier as an exemplar of normative 
masculinity.  
Ambivalent civilian masculinity/ies 
The discourse, as a consequence, appears to proffer ambivalent civilian masculinity/ies. The 
explicit contrasting of the supporters with the supported troops indicates it’s fair to read these 
expressions of masculinity as “not military” within the conventional understanding of a liberal 
civil-military distinction. In that sense, the construction of supporters as benevolent, 
hegemonically masculine subjects opens the door to the expression of meaningful and socially 
valorised non-military masculinity. At the same time, however, charitable “support the troops” 
discourse indicates that hegemonic masculinity continues to derive from associations with the 
military as a proving ground for good public personhood. To paraphrase Tidy, the normalisation 
of the troops as a form of social cause subtly reifies an underlying assumption that “military 
objectives are socially valuable”.82 The performance of hegemonic masculinity, though 
demonstrated (or accrued) through the public performance of protective and beneficent 
patronage rather than war participation or military service, still refers to “militaryness”.  
The discourse thus demonstrates a tension wherein the reading of supporters as non-military 
relies upon and reproduces the conventional liberal understanding of discrete civil and military 
spheres, while the performance of hegemonic Western masculinity by supporters blurs this divide 
through continual implicit association with militaryness. This double movement suggests a 
severing of any political relationship between the troops and civilian supporters through the idiom 
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of paternalistic charity. The discourse demonstrates a folding of purportedly-distinct civil and 
military spheres into the apolitical realm of affect – and simultaneous failure to explicitly construct 
supporters as civilians. This troubles a straightforward reading of non-military masculinity as 
simultaneously one of politically-relevant civility. The relationship between patron/beneficiary 
maps onto the civil-military divide without substantively engaging with its relationship to military 
service or conflict.  
Outside an explicitly political community, the status of supporters as substantively, rather than 
descriptively, “civilian” appears analytically and discursively ambiguous. This raises a series of 
interesting questions regarding meaningful civilianness. If support is cast as a matter of charity 
rather than war support/participation, is it fair to read it as “civilian”? Absent a meaningful 
engagement with notions of common political membership, can we read these discourses as 
offering a positive and substantive subjectivity? What, in other words, is the (gendered) 
relationship between politics, civilianness, and normative citizenship? 
Conditioning civilian masculinity/ies: The liberal military contract 
To address these questions, this section works through the various binaries the case study 
suggests are relevant to the possibilities of civilian masculinity/ies: civil/military, 
masculinity/femininity, and public/private. Existing gender scholarship and critical 
militarism/military studies have demonstrated these dichotomies are not timeless universals, or 
objective facts, but rather contingent effects of power.83 As indicated by the ambivalence of 
charitable UK civilian masculinity/ies, these binaries are often blurred and contradictory, even as 
they are ideologically and discursively reinforced as structural effects. Here, I draw upon a critical, 
historically-contextualised reading of liberal political thought to examine the ways in which, 
despite many critical analyses and empirical performances to the contrary, these associations may 
yet inform social relations and subjectivities. Consequently, the use of “liberalism” here reflects 
its contemporary interpretation both popularly and within international relations scholarship, 
rather than the specific minutiae of any particular theorist.84 
Masculinised citizenship 
As alluded to by the case, the question of politically viable civilian masculinities is largely one of 
the relationship between gender, violence, and normative public personhood. Liberal political 
thought, however, has seldom directly engaged with the question of civilianness (or soldiering, 
for that matter).85 Normative public behaviours of the individual vis-à-vis the polity are collapsed 
into the broader category of citizenship. “Citizenship-as-membership” is typically understood with 
regard to “status, rights, political engagement, responsibilities, and identity/solidarity”.86 It 
references the total public person beyond the use of collective force highlighted by civilianness.  
The ambiguous relationship between charitable support, civilianness, and political membership 
evidenced in the case, however, suggests that “civilian” and “citizen” are not synonyms. Citizen is 
a political category in a way in which “civilian”, despite its historical genealogy, is not.87 Unpacking 
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the uneasy co-existence of civilianness and citizenship thus offers a point of entry for thinking 
through, and about, the possibilities of civilian masculinity/ies.  
Broadly, within liberal thought, the spectre of force - the threat of physical harm and/or the desire 
to preserve property - spurs the creation of political community.88 Citizens give up their 
sovereignty to the state in return for its protection from internal violence and the anarchic 
international. They accept the political obligation that accompanies being in community, notably 
the duty to follow the law.89 Importantly, as argued by feminist political theorists, within classical 
liberal theory, as well as the general trajectory of Western political thought, the nature and 
purpose of politics were bound to an “ethos of manhood”.90 The universal, contracting liberal 
citizen is constituted in accordance with Western masculinist ideals of autonomy, rationality, 
agency, and the (latent) potential for violence.91  
The universalism of the liberal citizen, as an abstract ideal that theoretically pertains to all 
subjects, is thus observed by feminist scholars to obscure its masculinist underpinnings. The 
implicitly masculine citizen mirrors the reliance of the political and ideological coherence of the 
liberal state upon the now-familiar division of society into gendered (as well as classed, racialized, 
and sexualised) public and private spheres.92 Pateman argues that the “liberation” of the citizen 
through the liberal social contract required the subjugation of women (and the feminine) via rigid 
and essentialist gender roles, and corresponding social relations of exploitation and dependence: 
the “sexual contract”.93 Though poor women, for instance, have long worked outside the home, 
the constitution of the individual citizen as masculine furthered an overarching discursive 
construction of the “public” economic and political sphere as masculine, and the private domestic 
sphere as feminine.94  
Correspondingly, Brown observes that while the extension – both empirically and within evolving 
liberal political thought –  of individual rights to women (and minoritised groups) may have 
decoupled citizenship from a particular male (white, cisgender, heterosexual, property-owning) 
body, a universalised masculine “public” subjectivity remains the hallmark of normative 
citizenship.95 Liberal political thought produces an ideal-typical polity as pacific, rational, and a 
“means to individual ends”: a way of ensuring physical safety such that masculine citizens may 
pursue their own betterment.96  
As critical scholars observe, however, the rational, coordinated pursuit of individual liberty is not 
the entire story. Despite the liberal state’s ideological dependence upon claims to pacify the 
polity, 
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“The formal political power of the liberal state is expressed in its assertion of the ‘national interest’, … 
[enabling it to] pursue concerns higher than life. It is for ‘national security’ and ‘national honor’ that the state 
sacrifices its youth in foreign military interventions”.97 
The realization of the state’s monopoly on force requires that “citizen soldiers be prepared to kill 
and die” for the state.98 The metaphorical social contract is underwritten by a corollary bargain 
wherein individuals accept that “to be protected from violence by the nation-state is to be 
exposed to the violence wielded by the nation-state”.99 Membership is also premised upon a 
mythical “military contract”, which makes potential involvement in collective violence a condition 
– or political obligation – of belonging. As a result, normative citizenship is “construed as risking 
life… [wherein] a real man lays his life on the line”.100 “Good” citizens are constituted as (at least 
potentially) liable for military service. Though rarely explicitly stated, liberal political thought 
provides a subtle, yet significant, normative connection between liberal citizenship, masculinity, 
and military service: a “liberal military contract”.  
Historically, this account of the military-masculinity-citizenship nexus reflects and (re)produces a 
series of interlocking normative structures dating to (at least) the mass “nation in arms” of the 
French Revolution. Marked by the Lévee en masse (“national” conscription), the Revolution saw 
a devolution of the burdens of warfare from professional long-service armies to society as a 
whole.101 This societal mobilization was based on nationalistic ideals and membership in the 
patrie;102 military service was exchanged for democratic citizenship and civil and political rights. 
The institutional structure of the mass army expanded across Europe throughout the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, bringing with it the ideology of nationalism and concessions of 
citizenship required to legitimise mass conscription.103 By WWII, military service had been firmly 
entrenched as a normative obligation of democratic citizenship, while the onset of industrial-age 
“total war” involved all of society, through preparation, supply, or participation in battle.104 It is 
this overall Western imaginary, wherein liberal thought, democracy, and mass war participation 
“grew up together” – the specifics vary from state to state – that facilitates and is captured by the 
notion of the liberal military contract. My claim is not that the contract represents an actual 
moment/outcome of democratic decision-making or consolidation, nor that it was/is enacted in 
ideal-typical form. Instead, for the purposes of examining the politics of civilian masculinity/ies, I 
understand it as a cultural myth, a powerful socio-cultural narrative that imbues impressionist 
recollections of history and normative beliefs with affective valence – and projects them forward 
into the present.105  
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Gendered civil-military relations 
Importantly, the (ostensibly) universal citizen-soldier does not describe any given member of the 
polity. Masculine normative citizenship, and the gendered, spatialized binary between public and 
private upon which it rests, also typifies the structure of civil-military relations. The universalized 
citizen subject liable for military service was, historically, male, and, in classical and contemporary 
political thought, is masculine. The development of the mass army ensured that the majority of 
the male population engaged in state-sanctioned violence (or, in the case of volunteer militaries, 
as in pre-WWI UK, were potentially liable for military service). The ability and willingness to 
perpetrate violence became a requirement of masculine citizenship, wherein “the ultimate test 
of men’s political obligation is his willingness to give up his life in defence of the state”.106 Women 
were empirically and ideologically assigned “support” roles, such as caretaking, reproduction of 
“the nation”, symbolic potential victimhood etc., which constitute a feminine “other” to 
militarized masculinity.107  
Significantly, through the performance of violence and symbolic association with the state, 
soldiers are constructed as protecting non-serving civilians. This gendered structure of warfare is 
writ-large to the relationship, often cast in terms of heterosexual kinship, between a masculinized, 
protective military and a feminized society (or nation) vulnerable to harm.108 The best known 
formulation of this dynamic is Elshtain’s contrast of the masculine “Just Warrior”, charged with 
defending “home and hearth”, with the feminine (or societal) “Beautiful Soul” whose virtue and 
innocent domesticity require protection.109 This gendered association of women (and children) 
with civilian status is present in the writings of early-modern international legal theorists and,110 
as observed by Kinsella, was internationally affirmed with the post-WWII drafting of the Geneva 
Conventions.111 Conceptually, but also to a large degree empirically, a gendered division of 
“political” space underlies the social facticity of the liberal state. In its ideal-typical form, this 
spatiality relies upon and reproduces a gendered “civil-military gap”, separating feminised, 
dependent society from the protective, autonomous military.112 It is this gendered divide, as both 
normative ideological structure and an historical empirical regularity, that forms the key context 
for the analysis and articulation of politically viable, socially meaningful civilian masculinity/ies. 
Civilian + masculinity/ies = citizen? 
The competing normative imperatives, and uneasy associations, of the binaries raised by the case 
(masculine/feminine, soldier/civilian, military/civil, and public/private) are crystallised in ideals of 
normative citizenship. The above analysis suggests the figurative, or ideal-typical, universal citizen 
may be considered doubly masculine. The political aspect of citizenship is conducted in a public 
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sphere constituted in accordance with stereotypically masculine characteristics – particularly 
rationality and autonomy. The very possibility of this rational liberal politics relies, in turn, upon 
the underlying constitution of the citizen as a potential soldier, typified by masculine virtues of 
protection, sacrifice, and honour. Normative citizenship is defined by the willingness to “die for 
something”, namely the state, rather than being “willing to live for or through something”.113  
This conceptual schema illuminates the tensions and challenges that conditioned the articulation 
of intelligible civilian citizenship within the case. Civilian status has been produced within a 
strongly ideologically delineated (if empirically blurred) gendered civil-military divide as 
structurally feminine. Citizenship itself is constituted as not only normatively masculine, but 
dependent upon military service. The ambivalence of civilian masculinity/ies within UK discourse 
is thus reflective of, and politically conditioned by, an ideological/cultural context wherein 
femininity and civilianness are readily commensurate, but masculine civilianness114 - though, as 
seen in the case, not performatively impossible - challenges gendered expectations of normative 
citizenship. The ambivalent political chances of/for “civilian masculinity/ies” indicate a form of 
liminality, wherein it remains difficult to be read as, simultaneously, a civilian, a political subject 
and, bridging the two positions, normatively masculine.  
Gendered civilian anxiety 
There is a final twist on this heuristic, narrative account of the liberal military contract that is 
central to understanding the contemporary politics of liberal civilian masculinity/ies. Bluntly, 
there is nothing particularly liberal, nor necessarily democratic, about the normative structure of 
the “military contract”. It exists in tension with liberal ideas of civic rights against arbitrary 
violence, non-violent conflict resolution, and individual autonomy. Though the recourse to 
volunteer militaries has been posited by contemporary liberal thinkers – perhaps paired with a 
conscript lottery – as alleviating immediate problem of state coercion of individuals,115 it does not 
address the underlying normative obligation of service.116 The confluence of gendered cultural 
affects, narratives, and ethics regarding (at least potential) military service and citizenship 
suggests that in a time of war, all “good” masculine citizens ought to serve. But, as raised in the 
introduction, in a context of declining conscription across Western democracies,117 most people 
are civilians. We may therefore see the differential distribution of risk and obligation (which is 
gendered, classed, sexualised, and racialized) of volunteer militaries as accentuating the 
illiberality of the “military contract”. It violates the democratic principle of equality118 without 
extinguishing the gendered expectation that posits all citizens as liable to defend the whole. It 
raises the possibility that civilians may be failing to act appropriately.  
Consequently, I suggest “gendered civilian anxiety” is an entailment of the military-citizenship-
masculinity nexus within liberal thought and polities – and a means of thinking through the 
ambiguous politics of civilian masculinity/ies. “Anxiety” is understood in the 
psychoanalytic/existentialist sense of the transgressive potential of choice, or free will,119 rather 
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than an individual psychological or (necessarily) affective experience. As outlined by Kierkegaard, 
anxiety stems from the relationship between the subject (or individual) and a prohibition – 
generally understood as law – and the recognition that the subject has the potential to break the 
law.120 It comes less from actual acts of transgression than the realisation of a temptation, or 
desire, to break the rules, while still abiding by them.121 This notion of anxiety maps well onto our 
conventional understanding of the social contract. To live in community, citizens agree to abide 
by the rule of law – the authority and prohibition – but retain the ability (and desire) to break the 
law, which results in anxiety. As put by Zizek, “the more rigorously we OBEY the law, the more we 
bear witness to the fact that…we feel the pressure of the desire to indulge in [transgression]”.122 
Gendered civilian anxiety, following this logic, does not arise from the negative prohibition of law, 
but instead the positive obligation of military service/sacrifice: the liberal military contract. It 
derives from the possibility of ignoring, or shirking, an unwritten expectation of soldiering – and, 
further, the recognition of a desire to do so. Substantively, the concept draws upon Managhan’s 
diagnosis of US civil-military relations as characterised by a “cultural legacy of gendered guilt”.123 
Managhan refers to a dual, gendered bind facing (not exclusively, but particularly) women’s anti-
war activism. At one level, war opposition is easily constructed as a treacherous undermining of 
Just Warriors by the ungrateful Beautiful Souls. The impulse of the post-9/11 anti-war movement 
to “support the troops” may thus be construed as a “redemption” of the gendered betrayal of 
“our boys” during Vietnam. It is an anxious forestalling of the temptation to do so again in the 
future.124 At another level, we can also see “gendered guilt” in the normative (liberal) division of 
violent labour wherein, until recently, the burden of military service was not open to women – a 
potential (if involuntary) shirking of the responsibilities of citizenship. “Gendered civilian anxiety” 
therefore incorporates the parallel normative expectations of feminine “home front” loyalty and 
masculine military service – and the unease that stems from the dual possibility of contravening 
intertwined gender and citizenship norms. It encompasses all those who are/understand 
themselves to be civilians in wartime, as well as the anxiety pertaining to what it means to be a 
civilian in wartime, and attempts to account for the complicated, shifting gendering of the subject-
position.  
In the past, the citizens to whom this expectation pertained were men, and the expectation today 
remains a component of the implicitly masculine citizen subject-position. Throughout the 
twentieth century, however, military service became a crucial means for marginalised and 
minoritised groups to demonstrate belonging in the political community and demand recognition 
as citizens.125 The shifting roles of men and women mean that the sex/gender correspondence of 
the masculine, protective military and the feminine, protected society common to Western lay 
and philosophical understandings of civil-military relations no longer holds – if it ever did. 
Consequently, this anxiety is available and applicable to all those who might seek to self-identify 
with the performance of “good” liberal citizenship and/or hegemonic masculinity/ies. Accepting, 
for the moment, the gendered civil-military divide as contingent yet socially meaningful, non-
serving civilians are structurally associated with (purportedly feminine) society during wartime. 
There is a sense in which they are left without “an ontologically secure sense of military masculine 
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identity”,126 and, under the liberal military contract, without an ontologically secure citizen 
identity.  
This is not unique to the post-9/11 “global war on terror”, nor, necessarily, liberal societies. 
Goldstein observes that across cultures, past and present, gender norms connect “bravery and 
discipline in war to manhood – with shame as enforcement”.127 Women pelted soldiers with corn 
as “chickens” before the 1973 Chilean military coup,128 and military service in Russia today is 
frequently framed as a key characteristic of a desirable (male) partner and prerequisite for 
marriage.129 Particularly pertinent is the now-infamous presentation of white feathers by young 
women to non-serving men in the UK during WWI. These campaigns, along with state recruitment 
posters, drew on gendered logics of masculine shame and feminine vulnerability to encourage 
men to join the military.130 Gendered anxiety regarding the collective use of force is a perennial 
political problem. What this article argues is that the empirical shift away from mass military 
participation and large-scale existential conflict, paired with the ideologically-required 
incorporation of women as formally equal citizens into the liberal military contract, represents a 
qualitative shift in the scope of this disconnect – and is thus particularly helpful for thinking 
through the ambiguous politics of contemporary civilian masculinity/ies. 
Gendered anxiety and charitable support 
To come full circle, we can read charitable UK support the troops discourses as exhibiting traces 
of anxiety. The best example of this uneasiness is the Royal British Legion’s 2009 “Time to Do Your 
Bit” campaign.131 It called on MPs, electoral candidates, and the general public to “take the 
pledge” for the armed forces. Though the Legion suggested that “how you do that is up to you”, 
the charity lobbied MPs to sign explicit declarations that “I, First Name Surname, pledge to do my 
bit for the whole armed forces family”.132 The framing of this charitable campaign in the idiom of 
an oath implicitly reproduces the expectation that, again, in times of war, good people and good 
citizens should contribute. The gendered undertones of this call are clear, as the references to 
“doing one’s bit” evoke the WWI image of the small child asking their father, “What did you do in 
the war, Daddy?”,133 as an expectation of both good citizenship and masculinity. The sense of 
anxiety stems less from the content of the campaign than the process of asking for the pledge 
itself. The very necessity of soliciting the pledge acknowledges the possibility that civilians might 
not be doing their bit and, without prodding, might be tempted not to help, not to participate.  
 
This tenor of forestalled transgression is similarly apparent in the post-9/11 tendency of UK anti-
war NGOs to qualify their opposition to Iraq and, later, Afghanistan, with declarations of support 
for the troops. A 2003 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament statement upon the deaths of British 
military personnel in a helicopter crash illustrates this framing: “All life lost in this conflict, either by 
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accident or design, is a tragedy. As some of the placards on the anti-war protests have said, ‘Support 
our troops, bring them home.’”.134 As seen previously, the troops are framed as dependent and 
vulnerable, even feminised, through their connection to foreign civilian casualties – and are used to 
justify the group’s opposition to war. Protests and materials organised by the umbrella Stop the War 
Coalition were typified by similar frames. A 2005 protest, for instance, marched under the slogan “Stop 
the Bombings, Stop the War, Bring the Troops Home, Defend Civil Liberties and Defend the Muslim 
Community”.135 Once again, the troops are framed as a social cause like any other, emphasizing that 
the vulnerable troops are not betrayed, or undermined, as in Managhan’s account of gendered guilt, 
but paternalistically protected. This discourse is, at one level, a strategic way to get a fair hearing for 
war opposition.136 The specific idiom selected to do so – the causification of the troops – however, 
suggests an anxious engagement with the possibility, as with the Legion’s campaign, of not helping – 
of refusing the liberal military contract.  
 
War opposition may thus be paradoxically read as premised upon the anxious refusal of a desire to 
avoid the masculinist obligation of war participation and military sacrifice. In this context, the implicit 
allusions by the Legion to WWI, a time in which citizens might have been tempted to shirk their 
gendered obligation of military service itself – raises the spectre that charitable support per se 
might not be the appropriate form of normative citizenship at all…but a means of evasion. 
Gendered civilian anxiety may be read as stemming from both the temptation to transgress the 
obligations of the military contract (and corresponding expectations of hegemonic 
masculinity/ies) and the uneasy suspicion that this might already be taking place.  
This reading of UK charitable military support as demonstrating gendered civilian anxiety helps us 
to understand the ambiguous political possibilities of, and for, civilian masculinities. Casting 
military support as a private matter between individuals avoids (if not entirely successfully) the 
question of public political obligation. Instead, it “downsize[s]” citizenship to “a mode of 
voluntarism”.137 This enables a shift in the dominant tropes of Western hegemonic masculinity 
from the heroic (citizen)soldier that undergirds the liberal military contract to the empowered, 
beneficent charitable patron. This sidestepping of citizenship facilitates a flip in the conventional, 
liberal gendering of the civil-military divide, addressing the gendered aspect of anxiety by 
resignifying structurally feminized “society” as itself masculine. At the same time, however, the 
superficial “resolution” of this anxiety is premised upon military association, and militarised 
masculinity, through troop support. The elision of citizenship does little to address the underlying, 
constitutive connection between masculinity, military service, and citizenship. The ambivalence 
of the masculinity/ies articulated within this discourse – as structurally/descriptively civilian, yet 
of ambiguous substantive, political civility – remain contextualised by an anxious refusal of a 
potential desire to shirk the masculinist obligation of political violence.  
Conclusion 
This article argues for the analytical utility and political essentiality in theorising the conditions of 
possibility of “civilianness”, and civilian masculinity/ies, as the foundation of a new civil-military 
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research programme within international politics. The case study of charitable support for the 
military in the UK reveals a series of contingent yet socially and politically powerful (purported) 
dichotomies – civil/military, feminine/masculine, public/private, and to some degree, 
violence/politics – that are bound up in contemporary understandings of normative, particularly 
Western, liberal citizenship. It demonstrates the ways in which the intertwining of long-standing 
conceptual associations within liberal political theory and popular Western cultural myths as to 
war and military service places a conceptual and experiential “squeeze” on the articulation of 
legitimate, positive, and substantive civilian masculinity/ies during wartime. The ambivalent 
“civilianness” of the charitable performances of masculinity - as socially valued, non-military, and 
(at least immediately) non-violent, yet continuing to draw meaning and political legitimacy from 
implicit military associations – illustrates both the tenuousness and the mutable durability of the 
normative nexus of citizenship, military service, and masculinity. 
What is a fairly specific empirical case points us towards the broader stakes of the political 
possibilities of, and for, civilian masculinities. The ambiguous “civilianness” of these charitable 
masculinities reflect and reproduce what Wendy Brown reads as a broader breakdown in Western 
political discourse, deriving not from “maleness but institutionalised ideals of manhood…not 
politics, but [the] politics of estranged men”.138 By this, she refers to a “crisis” of the modern 
Western “politics-manhood relation”, wherein the masculinised subject of modern Western 
societies (who, in an era of formal equality, may be anyone) is no longer able, through the glorious 
and transcendent collective use of force, to eschew and overcome the indignities and banality of 
“mere”, feminine, life.139 Ambivalent civilian masculinity/ies – and its anxious relationship to 
unmet (and potentially un/desired) obligations of collective violence – gesture towards this larger 
politics wherein previously-hegemonic, socially-valorised models of masculinity and political 
subjectivity (the citizen-soldier) are revealed to be untenable without (yet?) being firmly 
supplanted by politically meaningful and legitimate alternative(s). 
Civilian masculinity/ies, as a concept, analytic, lever on contemporary civil-military relations, and 
empirical phenomenon thus offers an important and under-theorised point of entry into the 
gendered/ing dynamics of contemporary conflict. The anxiety pertaining to the liberal military 
contract, and its potential disconnect from contemporary civil-military relations, does not suggest 
“that this rupture will necessarily produce social and political chances worthy of celebration”.140 
But the “exhaustion of existing modes and practices” opens the possibility for an alternative 
politics of civility, citizenship, and new relationship to the use of force – and highlights the urgency 
in seeking them out.141 The open question as to the possibility of this form of masculinity/ies (as 
well as empowered citizen-civilian femininities),142 explicitly detached from socially-valorised 
violence, haunts a range of pressing, contemporary political questions which, though superficially 
disparate, may be unified into a coherent research programme.  
The ambivalence of “civilian masculinity” – at least with regard to those within the community, 
rather than in relation to distant others – is indicative of the substantial empirical and theoretical 
promise of the topic, which ought to be placed alongside existing examinations of, for instance, 
militant femininity, veteran masculinity, queer martiality, and/or the gendering of conscientious 
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objection.143 It highlights the conceptual and political difficulty – but also urgency – in unthinking 
easy associations between masculinity, political agency, and force. By providing an account of the 
liberal theoretico-ideological difficulty in accounting for civilian masculinity/ies, its elision in 
popular Western myths of military service/war, and an example of how such a politics may be 
assessed empirically, this article has laid the groundwork for cultivating a far better-specified 
understanding of the ways in which this trinity – masculinity, political agency, and violence – 
intersects. 
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